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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1)
Did the penalty phase jury instructions comply with
constitutional requirements by allowing the jury to consider all
evidence preferred by the defense in mitigation?
2)
Did the penalty phase jury instructions comply with
constitutional requirements by allowing the jury to weigh the
applicable aggravating and mitigating factors and come to a
reasoned moral judgment as to the appropriate penalty under all
the circumstances?
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OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the California Supreme Court is reported at
People V. Bovde. 46 Cal* 3d 212, 758 P.2d 25, 250 Cal* Rptr* 83
( 1983 ) .
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Judgment of the California Supreme Court was entered on
August 11, 1988.

The Jurisdiction of this Court rests upon 28

1

U.S.C» section 1257 (a).

The petition for writ of certiorari was

timely filed and granted on June 5, 1989.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
This case involves the eighth and fourteenth amendments to
the United States Constitution.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 15, 1981 petitioner Richard Boyde robbed a
7-Eleven store in Riverside, California of thirty-three dollars
and kidnapped the night clerk at gunpoint.

In a nearby orange

grove Boyde ordered the clerk to his knees and shot him three
times, killing him.

People v. Boyde, 46 Cal. 3d 212, 228, 758

p.2d 25, 250 Cal. Rptr. 83 (1988).
Boyde was tried and convicted of robbery, kidnapping for
robbery and first degree murder.

Mjl

The jury found that Boyde

personally used a firearm in perpetrating all three offenses, and
specially found that Boyde "personally killed [the victim] with
express malice aforethought and premeditation and deliberation."
Id.

The jury also found two special circumstances: murder during

the commission of a robbery and murder during the commission of
kidnapping.

Id.

At the penalty phase of the trial, the prosecution
introduced substantial evidence in aggravation regarding Boyde’s
extensive history of violent crime.

Idat 247-48.

Five

witnesses testified that they had been robbed by Boyde.
247.

Jd. at

Two witnesses testified that Boyde participated in an

assault on them.

Id.

Another witness testified that Boyde was
2

in a group which was throwing bricks at her car.

Id.

In mitigation, Boyde presented testimony by family and
friends of his poor and disadvantaged background, health
problems, poor academic performance and frequent trouble with
police.

Id.

Boyde also presented testimony by a psychologist of

his "inadequate personality with limited internal resources and
low self-esteem."

The psychologist further testified that Boyde

is often depressed and socially isolated, and that his
intelligence level is "on the edge between dull-normal and
borderline."

Id.

Following Boyde's presentation of mitigating evidence, the
jury was instructed that the penalty for a defendant found guilty
of murder of the first degree, where special circumstances are
found, shall be death or life imprisonment without possibility of
parole.

(J.A. 48).

To guide the jury in their determination of the appropriate
penalty, they were read CALJIC 8.84.1 (4th ed. 1979) which is
designed to guide the jury*s consideration of aggravating and
mitigating evidence.

The instruction directs the jury that it

"shall consider all of the evidence which has been received
during any part of the trial of this case."

The instruction then

enumerates eleven factors that the jury "shall consider, take
into account and be guided by ... if applicable."!

(J.A. 48).

1. The eleven factors, as read to Boyde’s jury, are as
follows:
(a) the circumstances of the crime of which the
Defendant was convicted in the present proceeding and the
3

The eleventh factor, hereinafter "factor (k)", directs the
jury to consider "any other circumstance which extenuates the
gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the
crime."

(J.A. 49).

The jury was further instructed that "the

existence of any special circumstances found to be true;
(b) the presence or absence of criminal activity by the
Defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or
violence or the expressed or implied threat to use force or
violence;
(c) the presence or absence of any prior felony
conviction;
(d) whether or not the offense was committed while a
Defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional
disturbance;
(e) whether or not the victim was a participant in the
Defendant’s homicidal conduct or consented to the homicidal act;
(f) whether or not the offense was committed under any
special circumstances which the Defendant reasonably believed to
be moral justification or extenuation for his conduct;
(g) whether or not the Defendant acted under extreme
duress or under the substantial domination of another person;
(h) whether or not at the time of the offense the
capacity of the Defendant to appreciate the criminality of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was
impaired as a result of mental disease or defect or the effects
of intoxication;
(i) the age of the Defendant at the time of the crime;
(j) whether or not the Defendant was an accomplice to
the offense and his participation in the commission of the
offense was relatively minor, and,
(k) any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity
or the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime.
The word extenuate means to lessen the seriousness of a crime as
by giving an excuse.
(J.A. 48-49).
4

word extenuate means to lessen the seriousness of a crime as by
giving an excuse."

Id.

The jury was then read CALJIC 8.84.2 (4th ed. 1979) which
sets out the jury’s duty to weigh aggravating and mitigating
factors in imposing the appropriate sentence.2
The jury fixed the penalty at death.

46 Cal. 3d at 221.

The Supreme Court of California, on automatic appeal, upheld the
jury’s death verdict, specifically finding that CALJIC 8.84.1
properly permitted the jury to consider all evidence presented by
the defense in mitigation.

Id^ at 251.

The court also found

that CALJIC 8,84.2 did not impermissibly require the jury to
return a death verdict unless appropriate under all the
circumstances of the case.

Id. at 253.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court must affirm Boyde’s sentence because the jury
instructions given satisfy the constitutional requirements of the
eighth and fourteenth amendments.
A death penalty statute must not preclude consideration of a
defendant’s relevant mitigating factors.

In considering whether

2. After having heard all of the evidence and having heard
and considered the arguments of counsel, you shall consider, take
into account and be guided by the applicable factors of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances upon which you have been
instructed.
If you conclude that the aggravating circumstances
outweigh the mitigating circumstances, you shall impose a
sentence of death. However, if you determine that the mitigating
circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances, you shall
impose a sentence of confinement in the state prison for life
without the possibility of parole.
(J.A. 49).
5

the instruction accorded the defendant his constitutional rights
the question is ’’what a reasonable juror could have understood
the charge as meaning.”
A reasonable juror could not have interpreted CALJIC 8.84.1
as excluding from consideration all of Boyde’s mitigating
evidence.

The language of factor (k) was non-exclusive and

directed the

jury to consider any circumstance which would

extenuate or lessen the gravity of the crime.
CALJIC 8.84.1 also instructed the jury to "consider all of
the evidence which had been presented during any part of the
trial of this case."

Boyde presented an abundance of evidence at

the penalty phase relating to his character and background.

The

jury could not have reasonably believed that though they were
permitted to hear this evidence, they could not consider it.
In addition, both counsel argued at length as to the proper
weight to be given Boyde’s evidence.

The prosecutor made

repeated references to evidence offered by Boyde at the penalty
stage.

Defense counsel further referred to factor (k) as a

catchall provision in his argument for giving great weight to
Boyde’s mitigating evidence.

After listening to testimony on

Boyde’s mitigating evidence and counsels’ arguments as to its
weight, the jury could not have concluded that this evidence
could not be considered.
The portion of CALJIC 8.84.2 to which Boyde objects can
only reasonably be interpreted as meaning that the jury must
weigh the relevant factors presented and come to reasoned moral
6

judgment as to the appropriate penalty.

The instruction seeks to

prevent the jury from deciding on one punishment or another
simply because of their reluctance to decide the ultimate fate of
the defendant.

This interpretation is entirely consistent with

statements made by both counsel during penalty phase argument.
CALJIC 8.84.2 did not, as Boyde argues, compel the jury to return
a sentence of death, unless they felt it to be appropriate under
all the circumstances.
An examination of the entire charge given the jury lends
further support to the conclusion that the jury understood the
nature and scope of its constitutional duty.

Boyde argues that

jurors may have believed that the weighing process was
quantitative and not qualitative and therefore did not comply
with the requirements of the constitution.

This argument is

directly refuted by counsel’s statements during both opening and
closing penalty phase arguments.

Both counsel repeatedly and

unequivocally informed jurors that the decision was not to be
based on any mechanical counting process.

Thus, the reasonable

juror could not have interpreted the instruction as requiring a
mere mechanical counting of the aggravating and mitigating
factors as Boyde contends.

Instead, the instruction clearly

called for a weighing of the relative substantiality and
persuasiveness of the relevant factors.

The personal decision of

each juror that Boyde should be sentenced to death was subsumed
within his or her decision that the aggravating circumstances
outweighed the mitigating circumstances.
7

ARGUMENT
I.

THIS COURT MUST AFFIRM BOYDE’S SENTENCE BECAUSE CALJIC
8.84.1 COMPORTED WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE EIGHTH AND
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS.
This Court established in Lockett v. Ohio. 438 U.S. 586

(1978), that ”[t]o meet constitutional requirements, a death
penalty statute must not preclude consideration of a defendant’s
relevant mitigating factors."

Id. at 608.

Boyde seeks to have

his sentence vacated on the grounds that the jury was
impermissibly precluded form considering evidence of his
character and background.

Boyde*s claim must fail as CALJIC

8.84.1 instructed his jury to consider any mitigating evidence
presented,
A.

Because CALJIC 8.84.1 did not preclude consider a t_i_pn__of
Bovde *s character and background evidence this Court
must affirm his sentence.

This Court stated in California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538
(1978), that in considering whether an instruction delivers an
accurate interpretation of the law, the question is "what a
reasonable juror could have understood the charge as meaning."
Id. at 541 (quoting Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. at 315 ( 1985)).
To determine how a reasonable juror could interpret an
instruction the Court "must focus initially on the specific
language challenged."

Id.

"If the specific instruction fails

constitutional muster, [the Court must] then review the
instructions as a whole to see if the entire charge delivered a
correct interpretation of the law."

8

Id.

In this case the

language of factor (k) is challenged and must be examined for
constitutional infirmities.
1.

The language of factor (k) was non-exclusive and
permitted the_jurv to consider evidence of Bovde*s
character and background.

The specific language challenged, factor (k), could not be
interpreted in a manner that would render it unconstitutional.
This court held in Lockett that "[T]he Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments require that the sentencer in . . . capital case[s]
must not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor,
any aspect of a defendant’s character or record . . . that the
defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death."
438 U.S. at 604. (emphasis in original).
Lockett involved Ohio’s sentencing scheme, which allowed
consideration of only three mitigating factors.

The statute

required the trial court to impose the death penalty upon
Lockett’s conviction for "aggravated murder with specifications,
unless it found "that (1) the victim had induced or facilitated
the offense, (2) it was unlikely that Lockett would have
committed the offense but for the fact that she *was under
duress, coercion, or strong provocation,* or (3) the offense was
primarily the product of [Lockett’s] psychosis or mental
deficiency."

Id. at 593-94.

None of these mitigating factors

were found to be applicable and the sentencing judge imposed the
death penalty.

Id. at 594.

The Ohio statute was found unconstitutional because it did
not permit individualized consideration of Lockett’s mitigating
9

circumstances.

Id» at 606-08.

Lockett had offered evidence that

she played a relatively minor role in a robbery which resulted in
a homicide actually perpetrated by another; that she had
previously committed no major offenses; and that a psychological
report described her prognosis for rehabilitation as favorable.
Id, at 594.

This Court found that since the limited range of

mitigating circumstances allowed by the statute did not permit
the sentencer to consider this evidence, the statute was
incompatible with the eighth and fourteenth amendments.

Id. at

609.
In contrast to the Ohio statute, CALJIC 8.84.1 permitted
consideration of all evidence offered by Boyde concerning his
character and background.

The jury was given a list of eleven

statutory factors to consider, some aggravating and others
mitigating.

The last was factor (k) which directed the jury to

consider "any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of
the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime."
(J.A. 49).

The language of factor (k) was plainly non-exclusive.

It permitted consideration of "any other circumstance" offered as
evidence which would call for a sentence of less than death.
Coming at the end of the list, it acted as a catch-all phrase,
allowing consideration of any other circumstance not previously
enumerated.

No reasonable juror could have thought that "any

other circumstance" meant anything other than its plain and
ordinary meaning—anything not previously considered.

Because

factor (k) was phrased in non-exclusive terms, CALJIC 8.84.1
10

permitted the type of individualized consideration required by
the constitution.
This interpretation is consistent with this Courtis
construction of the sentencing statutes of Florida and Texas.
Florida’s death penalty statute in Proffitt v. Florida. 428 U.S.
242 (1976), contained lists of aggravating and mitigating
factors.

Id. at 248-49 n.6.

Language in the statute limited

consideration of aggravating circumstances to those enumerated.3
In approving the statute this Court held that since there was "no
such limiting language introducing the list of statutory
mitigating factors" the list was not exclusive.

Id., at 249 n.8.

Texas* statute in Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976), made
no explicit references to mitigating factors.

Rather, the jury

was merely required to answer two questions in the sentencing
process.4

The statute was found constitutional because the Court

3,
The language of the Florida statute explicitly provided
that "[a]ggravating circumstances shall be limited to the
following [eight specified factors]." There was no such limiting
language introducing the list of statutory mitigating factors.
428 U.S. at 249 n.8 (emphasis in original).
4.

The three questions were as follows:

(1) whether the evidence established beyond a
reasonable doubt that the murder of the deceased was committed
deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death
of the deceased or another would result,
(2) whether the evidence established beyond a
reasonable doubt that there was a probability that the defendant
would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a
continuing threat to society.
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the defendants
conduct in killing the deceased was unreasonable in response to
provocation, if any, by the victim.
11

concluded that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals had broadly
interpreted the second question“-despite its facial narrowness—
as to permit the sentencer to consider "whatever mitigating
circumstances" the defendant might be able to show.
73.

Id. at 272«

Neither of these sentencing statutes explicitly informed the

jury that it may consider mitigating factors which were not
enumerated in the statute.
By comparison, CALJIC 8.84.1 presents an even clearer
sentencing guideline.

Factor (k) specifically instructed the

jury to consider any other extenuating factors not listed in the
instruction.

It thus presents a stronger case than Proffitt or

jurek where non-exclusiveness had to be inferred from the lack of
limiting language.

Discussing its rationale in upholding the

Florida and Texas sentencing schemes, this Court stated that
neither of them "clearly operated at that time to prevent the
sentencer from considering any aspect of the defendant’s
character and record or any circumstances of his offense as an
independently mitigating factor."
(emphasis added).

Lockett, 438 U.S. at 607

In Boyde’s case, far from clearly limiting the

jury’s consideration of mitigating evidence, factor (k) provided
a much more explicit instruction than did either Proffitt or
Jurek.
Boyde’s reliance on Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393
(1987), is misplaced.

Hitchcock involved a Florida death-penalty

Jurek. 428 U.S. at 269.
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statute, which required the advisory Jury to determine whether

sufficient enumerated mitigating circumstances outweighed the
aggravating circumstances.

Id. at 395-96.

Despite argument from

defendant’s counsel that Hitchcock’s character and family
background evidence should be considered, the trial judge
believed that the court could only consider circumstances
enumerated in the statute.

Id_^^ at 398.

This Court held that

since the sentencing Judge refused to consider this evidence, the
proceeding did not comport with the constitutional mandates of
T.ockett.

Id ■

Hitchcock is distinguishable because none of the statutory
mitigating factors in the Florida statute instructed the Jury to
consider any circumstance beyond those listed.

The Florida

statute contained no equivalent to factor (k).

In fact, the

Florida statute read much like that of CALJIC 8.84.1 without
factor (k).5

As already discussed, factor (k) allows a Jury to

consider mitigating factors which were not specifically
enumerated in the statue.

Boyde attempts to analogize Hitchcock

5. The Florida statute provided that the mitigating
circumstances "shall be the following: that the defendant had no
significant history of prior criminal activity; that the crime
was committed while the defendant was under the influence of
extreme mental or emotional disturbance; that the victim
participated in or consented to the crime; that defendant was
merely an accomplice whose participation in the crime was
relatively minor; that the defendant acted under duress or
domination; that the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the
criminality of his conduct or to conform that conduct tot he
requirements of law was substantially impaired; and the age of
the defendant at the time of the crime."
Hitchcock. 481 U.S. at 396.
13

to his case on the basis that the trial judge in both instances
instructed the jury to consider only statutory factors.

However,

Boyde ignores the fact the factor (k) refers to any circumstances
so that the jury’s consideration of mitigating factors was not
limited to those factors enumerated.
Boyde also mistakenly contends that amendments to factor (k)
establish that the version given him was deficient.

He cites

this Court’s decision in Mills v. Maryland, __ U.S. ___, 109
S.Ct. 1860 (1988 ), as authority.

In Mills, this Court

interpreted the Maryland death sentence verdict form as creating
a substantial probability that reasonable jurors may have thought
they could not consider any mitigating evidence unless all 12
jurors agreed on the existence of a particular circumstance.
at 1870.

Id,

The Court noted that, since petitioner’s case had been

decided, the Maryland Court of Appeals had promulgated a new
verdict form in which the section concerning mitigating
circumstances had been completely rewritten.

Id. at 1869.

This

Court inferred from such significant changes "some concern on the
part of that court that juries could misunderstand the previous
instruction."

Id.

Boyde misinterprets the extent of the holding in Mills.
The Court stated "we are hesitant to infer too much about the
prior verdict form from" the later revisions.

109 S.Ct. at 1869.

The Court noted that the revision brought about "significant
changes" in the instructions to the jury.

Id.

(emphasis added).

Thus, to contend, as Boyde does, that the changes made to factor
14

(k) establish its infirmity is to take Mills farther than this
Court intended.
Factor (k) thus meets the first test for constitutionality
discussed in Brown.

Boyde was not denied individualized

consideration called for in Lockett and therefore his sentence
should stand.
2.

A reasonable iuror could not have interpreted the
entire charge of CALJIC 8.84.1 as precluding
consideration of Boyde*s character and background
evidence.

While it is not necessary to proceed to the second part of
the Brown analysis outlined above, under this test Boyde’s claim
would also fail.

CALJIC 8.84.1 initially instructed the jury to

consider "all of the evidence which has been received during any
part of the trial of this case."

The jury was then instructed to

consider the enumerated factors, the last being factor (k).
Together, the two instructions plainly directed the jury to
consider all Boyde*s proffered evidence and determine if anything
might call for a sentence less than death.

The jury could not

have reasonably believed that though they were permitted to hear
Boyde's mitigating evidence presented and were told to consider
all evidence, they could not consider the testimony concerning
his character and background.
Boyde’s argument fails for inconsistency when factor (C) is
considered.

Boyde argues that because all the statutory factors

listed in (a) - (j) concern circumstances immediately related to
the crime, the jury could have construed factor (k) as relating

16

only to such circumstances.

However, factor (c) directed the

jury to consider ’’the presence or absence of any prior felony
conviction.”

Factor (c) has nothing to do with immediate

circumstances of the crime.

It concerns a defendant’s past and

whether the past has been blemished with a felony conviction.
Boyde,

in fact, had numerous prior felony convictions which were

brought out by the prosecution.

Factor (c) thus required the

Jury to consider Boyde * s past trouble with the law--a
consideration which does not immediately relate the circumstances
of the crime.

Consequently, there is no reason to believe that

the focus of factors (a) - (j) would mislead a juror into
thinking that character and background evidence was irrelevant.
Quite the contrary, it is unreasonable to contend that the Jury
would think that it could consider background evidence which
aggravated Boyde’s position but not that which mitigated it.
CALJIC 8.841.1 thus delivered a correct interpretation of
the law.

It instructed the Jury to consider all evidence

presented and permitted consideration of background and character
evidence through factor (k).
B.

The jury could not have believed that factor (k)
excluded Bovde’s mitigating evidence when both counsel
argued as to the effect it should be given.

The Jury could not have reasonably believed that, though it
was permitted to hear Boyde’s background and character evidence
and both attorney’s arguments concerning that evidence, it could
not consider that evidence.
This Court has recognized that when ascertaining what a
16

reasonable juror could have believed, consideration may be given

to statements made by counsel concerning jury instructions.

In

California v. Brown. 479 U.S. 638, Justice O’Connor in a
concurring opinion stated that a court "should determine whether
the jury instructions, taken as a whole, and considered in
combination with the prosecutor’s closing argument, adequately
informed the jury of its responsibility to consider all of the
mitigating evidence introduced by the respondent."
546 (O’Connor, J., concurring).

479 U.S. at

This approach recognizes that

the jury is influenced by the totality of instructions, evidence,
and counsels* statements concerning weight and meaning of the
evidence.
In Boyde’s case this is particularly true considering the
amount of mitigating evidence presented.

Boyde presented an

abundance of evidence at the penalty stage, all relating to his
background and character.

He presented lengthy testimony from

his family, friends, and psychologist concerning his broken home,
his lack of education, his psychological disorders and his
disposition as a giving person.
Moreover, Boyde’s mitigating evidence was presented last,
just before counsels’ closing arguments.

Boyde would have this

Court believe that the jury entered into deliberation consciously
disregarding all the testimony which was freshest in their minds.
Considering that both the prosecutor and defense counsel argued
extensively as to the weight to be given this evidence, such a
contention is untenable.

In his penalty phase argument, the
17

prosecutor stated:
Then we come to . . . "Any circumstance which extenuates the
i?ravity of this crime" and what we have heard about this
defendant is that he persistently lies, he’s got a low
tolerance for frustration, he lacks patience, shows little
or no effort to work in his life or contribute
constructively to anything.
(J.A. 43).

This statement was clearly in reference to testimony

presented by Boyde’s family and friends about his character.

He

also stated:
If you look and you read what it says about
extenuation, it says, "To lessen the seriousness of a crime
as by giving an excuse." Nothing I have heard lessens the
seriousness of this crime, nothing.
I am not willing to accept responsibility in this case
for someone else, I am not willing to hold his mother
responsible for it, I am not willing to hold his school
responsible for him, I am not willing to hold the Youth
Authority responsible for him.
(J.A. 46).

Again, the prosecutor was referring to the background

and character evidence presented by Boyde.

And, while he was

arguing that in his view the evidence did not sufficiently
mitigate Boyde’s conduct, by doing so he necessarily indicated
that consideration of the evidence was proper under factor (k).
The prosecutor never stated nor even suggested that the
background and character evidence could not be considered.
Defense counsel also argued that Boyde’s background and
character evidence should be considered under factor (k).

He

referred to factor (k) as a catchall provision that allowed the
Jury to consider the defendant as an individual.

(J.A. 47).

He

explained to the jury that the type and number of potentially
mitigating factors are too numerous to list and that the statute
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drafters phrased factor (k) to account for any possible
circumstance.

Id.

He then argued at length for giving great

weight to Boyde’s proffered evidence in consideration of him as
an individual.

Id^ at 48.

With regard to the statutory factors,

the defense counsel told the .jury that '*we are not asking you to
step outside these factors" but to consider them fully and ask
"Can K outweigh A through J."

Id_.

For Boyde’s contention to hold water, the jury must have
believed that despite instructions directing them to consider all
evidence, the factor (k) instruction, an abundance of mitigating
evidence and counsels’ arguments as to its effect, they could not
consider any factor not immediately related to the murder. Such a
contention flies in the face of reason.
Boyde relies on Penrv v. Lvnaugh. __ U.S. __ , 109 S. Ct.
2934 (1989), for his contention that CALJIC 8.84.1 was
unconstitutional under the circumstances despite presentation of
mitigating evidence and counsels’ arguments.

While this Court

held that to be true in Penrv, the circumstances of that case are
sufficiently different than the case at bar to render Penry
inapplicable.
Penrv involved the same Texas sentencing statute as in
Jurek, requiring the jury to answer three special issues.6
6.

The three special issues are as follows;

(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused
the death of the deceased was committed deliberately and with the
reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased or another
would result;
19

t

109 S.Ct. at 2942.

Penry had presented evidence showing

he was mentally retarded and was abused as a child.

Id. at 2941.

His counsel argued that if a juror believed that Penry, because
of this mitigating evidence, did not deserve to be put to death,
the juror should vote "no” on one of the special issues even if
it believed the State had proved that the answer should be "yes.”
"In rebuttal, the prosecution countered by stressing that the
jurors had taken an oath to follow the law, and they must follow
the instructions they were given in answering the special
issues."

Id. at 2950.

The jury answered "yes" to all three

issues and the court sentenced Penry to death.

This Court

reversed his sentence, holding that the combination of the
prosecutor’s argument and the absence of appropriate jury
instructions could lead a reasonable juror to believe that
Penny’s mental retardation and childhood abuse evidence could not
be considered.

Id,, at 2950.

The effect of the prosecutor’s statements in Penry
distinguish it from this case.

The prosecutor in Penry

effectively argued that the jury could not consider Penny’s
mental retardation and childhood abuse evidence.

And, it is

(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant
would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a
continuing threat to society; and
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of
the defendant in killing the deceased was unreasonable in
response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased.
Penry. 109 S.Ct. at 2942.
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clear that the Penry Court considered the prosecutor’s improper
statements as a significant factor in its decision.

By contrast,

the substance of the prosecutor’s argument in Boyde’s case was
that his mitigating evidence was relevant but inadequate.
Also, in determining that a special instruction was required
in Penrv. this Court focused on the peculiar circumstances of
Penny’s mental retardation and childhood abuse.
2948-60.

109 S.Ct. at

This Court found that these particular circumstances

could not be given mitigating effect because of the strict "yesno" dichotomy of the sentencing statute.

Id.

The Court did not

hold that a special instruction would be required whenever any
background or character evidence was presented.

Rather, just

that in Penny’s case evidence of mental retardation and child
abuse required a special instruction.

The Penry decision must

accordingly be limited to the facts of that case.
II.

CALJIC 8.84,2 PROPERLY ALLOWED JURORS TO WEIGH THE
RELEVANT AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING FACTORS AND COME TO A
REASONED MORAL JUDGMENT AS TO THE APPROPRIATE PENALTY UNDER
ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
A.

The sentencing .iurv must be given guided discretion, iji
deciding whether to impose the penalty of death.

A jury may not be given unbridled discretion in deciding

whether to impose the sentence of death.
U.S. 238 (1972).

Furman v. Georgia. 408

On the other hand, this Court has held that a

state may not constitutionally make death mandatory for a
specified crime.

E.g., Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S, 66 (1987)

(mandatory death sentence for murder committed while serving life
sentence without possibility of parole);
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Woodson v. North

Carolina« 428 U.S. 280 ( 1976) (mandatory death sentence for first

degree murder).
Gregg

V.

Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 ( 1976 ), decided the same day

as Woodson, upheld a newly enacted Georgia capital sentencing
statute designed to satisfy the constitutional deficiencies
identified in Furman.

The new statute provided, inter alia, that

juries be directed to consider a list of ten statutory
aggravating circumstances.

In order to impose the death penalty,

the jury was first required to find at least one aggravating
circumstance to be true.

Id. at 196-97.

This scheme, since it

first narrowed the class of individual defendants upon whom the
death sentence might be imposed, and then required the jury to
decide the appropriate sentence, limited the unguided discretion
found constitutionally defective in Furman.

Xd_s.

Thus, the constitution requires that a balance be struck
between guidance and discretion.

While the sentence of death may

not be mandatory upon a mere finding of guilt, a jury may not be
given untrammeled discretion to decide, without a concrete set of
guidelines, whether a defendant should live or die.
Having established the constitutional framework within which
a jury instruction must be examined, we turn to the instruction
under which Boyde was sentenced to death.
B.

Applying the Brown test to CALJIC 8.84.2, it is
apparent that Boyde*s jury could only have interpreted
^he_instruction as permitting it to make a reasoned
moral judgment as to the appropriate penalty under al_l
the circumstances.

Applying the Brown test, this Court must decide what a
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reasonable juror could have understood CALJIC 8.84.2 as meaning.

"To determine how a reasonable juror could interpret an
instruction, la reviewing court] *must focus initially on the
specific language challenged.’ (citation ommitted) If the
specific instruction fails constitutional muster, we then review
the instructions as a whole to see if the entire charge delivered
a correct interpretation of the law."

California v. Brown, 429

U.S. 538 (quoting Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. at 315).
doing

In

, it is appropriate to consider statements made by

80

counsel during argument.

Such statements may significantly

impact the jury’s interpretation of an instruction, and are
therefore relevant and helpful in construing a particular
instruction as a reasonable juror would.

Penry v._Lynaugh, --

U.S. ___, 109 S. Ct. 2934.
Applying the Brown test, the Court here must first examine
the specific language of CALJIC 8.84.2.
1.

CALJIC 8.84.2 was
requiring them to
if they concluded
penalty under all

interpreted by the jury as
return a verdict of death onl_y:
that death was the appropriate
the circumstances.

CALJIC 8.84.2 was interpreted by Boyde’s jury as requiring
it to sentence Boyde to death only if it deemed death to be the
appropriate penalty under all the circumstances of the case.

The

portion of CALJIC 8.84.2 to which Boyde objects reads as follows:
"If you conclude that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the
mitigating circumstances, you shall impose a sentence of death.
(J.A. 49).
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Boyde arj^ues that this misled the jury as to its role in
determining the appropriateness of the death penalty.

In doing

so, he adopts an artificial and implausible construction of the
language of the instruction, and ignores the arguments made by
the prosecution and defense counsel that belie the very interpre
tation he argues is so plausible.

Boyde claims that jurors may

have felt compelled to return a sentence of death even if they
personally felt that life without the possibility of parole would
be the appropriate punishment.
25, 26).

(Brief for Petitioner at 22-23,

The only interpretation to which the instruction is

reasonably susceptible, however, is one which required the jurors
to impose the death penalty only if they believed that death was
the appropriate penalty under all the circumstances.

The

language of the instruction did no more than to require that
jurors, in accordance with their duty to apply the law, impose
the death sentence if they unanimously decided it was
appropriate.

Through the use of CALJIC 8.84.2, the jury was

admonished not to avoid reaching such a decision simply because
of the potentially grave consequences of that decision and the
great responsibility it entailed.
This interpretation is buttressed by statements made by the
prosecutor during opening argument at the penalty phase.

The

prosecutor cautioned the jury as follows:
[Djon’t try to avoid the tough decision by sitting and
trying to rationalize or trying to seek a way out of a tough
decision, you are going to have to face it head on, you are
going to have to go through each and every one of these
factors and decide it. Is this the case, is this the kind
of case as 1 am guided by these factors that warrants the
24

death penalty.
(J.A. 44) (emphasis added).

The prosecutor clearly and

unequivocally informed the jury that the penalty of death could
be imposed only if each juror personally decided that "[Boyde’s
case is] the kind of case as I am guided by these factors that
warrants the death penalty."

Thus, the decision to impose the

penalty of death was not reached as a result of any mandatory
language in the instruction, but rather because each juror
believed that it was the appropriate penalty for Boyde's crime.
The only aspect of the instruction that is arguably
mandatory is the requirement that they not disregard their
decision simply because of its serious consequences and their
reluctance to shoulder the burden of deciding the fate of the
defendant.

The prosecutor recognized that this was a real

possibility where, as here, the tremendous responsibility
involved in making the decision was repeatedly driven home to the
jury.
For this reason it is important to note that jurors were
aware that the ultimate decision of whether death should be
imposed rested solely with them.
V.

Boyde argues, citing Caldwell

Mississippi. 472 U.S. 320, 331-33 (1985), that the jury may

have somehow been misled as to its role in the capital sentencing
process.

(Brief for Petitioner at 23.)

Caldwell, however, is

readily distinguishable from the present case.
In Caldwell. the Court vacated defendant’s death sentence
because it found that arguments made by the prosecution during
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the penalty phase may have led jurors to believe that they played
only a small* insubstantial role in determining the sentence.
The Court found that the jurors may have believed that the
ultimate decision as to the appropriate penalty rested with an
appellate court.

The Court felt that a jury would, therefore, be

more likely to impose the death penalty "to 'send a message’ of
extreme disapproval for the defendant’s acts."

472 U.S. at 331.

In Boyde’s case, however, jurors were repeatedly informed that
they themselves would make the ultimate determination of the
appropriate penalty.

As noted above, the prosecutor repeatedly

admonished the jury not to "try to avoid the tough decision, [but
to] face it head on." (J.A. 44).

He continued: "fYlou are going

to have to go through each and every one of these factors and
decide it."

Id.

(emphasis added).

Defense counsel, during

closing penalty phase argument, similarly informed jurors that
the decision was theirs alone:

"[W]hatever your judgment is, let

it be the best judgment you are capable of. . . . [Wjhatever your
decision is, we will abide."

(J.A. 48) (emphasis added).

It is,

therefore, almost inconceivable that the jury would not have
understood that the decision to impose death rested with them
alone.
Boyde also argues that the instruction is constitutionally
deficient because "[t]he final determination of whether
aggravating factors 'outweigh* mitigating factors . . . lacks
specificity."

(Brief for Petitioner at 23).

He asserts that the

failure of the statute to inform the jury "the amount necessary
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to tip the scale" one way or the other amounts to a defect of
constitutional proportions.

Id.

In support of this argument, Boyde points to the fact that
California has subsequently revised CALJIC 8.84.2.
is unpersuasive.

This argument

The mere fact that California has subsequently

chosen to clarify and expand on the instruction to more
explicitly inform the jury of its role does not mandate the
conclusion that such a clarification was constitutionally
required.
On the contrary, Boyde’s reliance on this revision to
suggest that the former instruction was unconstitutional
underscores his failure to cite any decision of this Court
supporting his contention that the process prescribed by the
revision is even desirable, not to mention constitutionally
required.

Indeed, this Court has never held that a trier of fact

must conclude, before it may constitutionally impose the death
penalty, that aggravating circumstances substantially outweigh
mitigating circumstances.

The Court has only required that, in

order for a defendant to be eligible for the death penalty, there
be some device, such as the presence of an aggravating
circumstance, that serves the purpose of "narrowing the class of
persons convicted of murder who are eligible for the death
penalty."

Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 875 (1982); Gregg v.

Georgia. 428 U.S. 153, 196-97.

Having so narrowed the class, the

trier of fact need only conclude that, in light of the various
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the penalty of death is
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warranted.

Gregg. 428 U.S. at 197.

Likewise, this Court has never sought to intrude upon the
decision-making function of capital sentencing Juries by
imposing, as does the subsequently revised version of CALJIC
8.84.2, a prescribed method of weighing aggravating against
mitigating circumstances,

, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153.

Although California is, of course, free to do so if it chooses,
nothing in any of the constitutional decisions of this Court
requires it to.

This argument, accordingly, must fail.

Boyde asserts that a recent "study" conducted by the Alameda
County District Attorney’s Office concludes that the type of
verdict form given the Jury "could impact its decision whether or
not to impose the death penalty."

(Brief for Petitioner at 33).

He claims that "Juries instructed using a two step process—first
weighing aggravating circumstances against mitigating
circumstances, then, second, determining the appropriate
sentence—were more likely to return a verdict of life without
parole than death."

Id.

Boyde further argues that since his

Jury was not given such a verdict form his sentence must be
reversed.

Id.

This argument is also unpersuasive.

Boyde’s mere bald

assertion that, in a handful of isolated cases, there seem to be
fewer death sentences imposed when a particular verdict form is
used is simply not conclusive.

These cases fall well short of

demonstrating any clear defect in CALJIC 8.84.2.

In any event,

this is hardly the kind of evidence that would be sufficient to
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persuade this Court that Boyde*s jury was improperly instructed.
This "study" has not been shown to be statistically significant,
nor is it logically persuasive enough to require this Court to
reverse Boyde’s sentence.

This Court has, in the past, rejected

more sophisticated studies than the one put forth here.
Mr'nlt^skev

V.

Eg_i.

Kemp. 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (Court rejects as

inconclusive "two sophisticated statistical studies that examine
over two-thousand murder cases" using two hundred and thirty
variables and purportedly demonstrating a disparity in the
imposition of death sentences based on race).
Since CALJIC 8.84.2, considered by itself, is clearly
constitutionally sound under the first prong of the Brown test,
it is not necessary for this Court to reach the second part of
the Brown analysis, and the inquiry should end here.

However, an

examination of the entire charge lends further support to the
conclusion that the jury was fully and accurately instructed
regarding the nature and scope of its constitutional duties in
imposing the penalty of death.
2.

The entire charge was interpreted by the
reasenable juror as requiring a gualitative
weighing of the various,a^g.rav.aAing—and miti^ating
factors in deciding the appropriate penalty under
all the circumstances.

The complete set of instructions read to the jury in the
penalty phase of Boyde*s trial could only be interpreted by the
reasonable juror as permitting a qualitative weighing of
aggravating and mitigating factors in deciding whether death was
the appropriate penalty for Boyde’s crimes.
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Prior to the judges reading of CALJIC 8.84.2, the jury was
instructed with CALJIC 8.84.1 which reads, in pertinent part, as
follows:
In determining which penalty is to be imposed on the
Defendant, you shall consider all of the evidence which has
been received during any part of the trial of this case.
You shall consider, take into account and be guided by the
following factors. if applicable . . .
(J.A. 48-49) (emphasis added).

The instruction then proceeds to

enumerate eleven statutory aggravating and mitigating circum
stances,

(a) through (k).

These eleven factors do not indicate to the jury whether
each should be considered to aggravate or mitigate the gravity of
the offense.

The instruction does not dictate to the jury how to

assess the relative importance of the factors, nor does it
prescribe to the jury the method by which it must conduct the
weighing process.

Jurors were merely instructed to "consider,

take into account and be guided by" whichever factors they felt
to be applicable.
Thus, it was left to each juror to first decide what
bearing, if any, each factor has on the gravity of the offense.
In other words, did a particular factor mitigate or aggravate the
crime?

Second, each juror decided what relative weight ought to

be attached to each factor.

That is, how substantial was that

factor in relation to the other statutory factors?

The jury then

proceeded to "consider, take into account, and be guided by" each
factor in making the ultimate determination that death was the

30

proper sentence.
The instruction did not require the Jury to mechanically
count the factors that mitigate the offense and count those that
aggravate the offense, imposing the death sentence if aggravating
factors were slightly more numerous than mitigating ones.

The

weighing process was Just that--an intangible comparison of the
relative substantiality and persuasiveness of the mitigating
factors considered against the aggravating factors.

At the

completion of this process, the Jury decided which was more
substantial in each Juror’s perception of the nature of the
eleven factors, aggravating or mitigating, the weight to be given
each factor, and the quantum of mitigating circumstances required
to counterbalance any aggravating circumstances.

In this way,

the personal determination that the appropriate verdict is death
was subsumed within each juror’s decision that the aggravating
circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances.
Nevertheless, Boyde argues that the Jury "could have been
confused concerning the nature of the weighing process" because
the instruction "failed to specifically instruct that the
weighing process is not a mere quantitative counting of factors
on an imaginary scale but rather a qualitative balancing
process."

(Brief for Petitioner at 20).

Boyde argues that the

Jury may have been misled into believing that the weighing
process was a quantitative, not a qualitative one.

Id. at 30.

This argument, "[wjhile strained in the abstract, ... is simply
untenable when viewed in light of the surrounding circumstances."
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Ca]ifornia v» Brown, 479 U»S. 538» 542 (1987).

Statements by both counsel directly refute petitioner’s
argument.

At opening penalty phase argument, the prosecutor

advised the Jury that "lt]he process of weighing ... is a
rational process, it is a process of being able to go through
each factor, decide whether ... it aggravates or mitigates . .
.

, consider that factor in relation to the other factors that

you'll hear, and come to a rational decision."

(J.A. 42).

Defense counsel, at opening penalty phase argument, also
unequivocally informed the jury of the qualitative nature of the
weighing process:
Secondly, don’t play a numbers game. I like the word
qua! itative. It says a lot. There is such a thing as a
quantitative analysis. That is just totaling all things up
on one side of the sheet, totaling up the things on another,
deciding it on the sheer basis of numbers. . . . You have
^ot a qualitatiye analysis to go through here whic.h__means
that when you _get down to the point of weighi_n_g^yi_de_n_ce_it
i_s not„_just a _questiqn__qf_.saying_hpw_man>i_crimes__di.d_he
c ORm itj.._li n in5 _t hem __up.„agaijist_wh_at^..gpp_d_ deed s._he_may_haye
do ne._i n,_l if e,_lining those up then just making some sort of

analysis on _th_at_.
I am suggesting that vou do a qualitative analysis.
(J. A. 44) (emphasis added).

Given this explicit statement,

Boyde’s contention that the jury was not "specifically
instruct[ed] that the weighing process is not a mere quantitative
counting of factors" is difficult to comprehend.
As further support for his argument that the jury was misled
into believing that it was to conduct a quantitative, mechanical
counting of factors, Boyde quotes from statements made by the
prosecutor during individual voir dire.
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He contends that, during

questioning of four of the jurors, the prosecutor somehow
mischaracterized the role of the jury in the penalty phase so as
to lead a juror to believe '’that he or she had no choice but to
return the death sentence." (Brief for Petitioner at 22-24).
However, Boyde fails to cite any decision of this Court, and
respondent has found none, supporting Boyde’s assertion that such
statements may properly be considered by a reviewing court in
assessing the jury’s interpretation of a challenged instruction.
Indeed, this Court, in Penry v. Lvnaugh. __ U.S. __ , 109
S.Ct. 2934, despite a careful examination of statements made by
both counsel during the penalty phase argument of that case, did
not feel it was appropriate to look to voir dire statements as
indicative of what a reasonable juror could have understood the
charge as meaning.

Id. at 2949-50.

Voir dire often takes place

weeks or even months prior to the reading of jury instructions,
and cannot have any meaningful effect on a jury’s later
interpretation of an instruction.

This is especially true where,

as in this case, remarks by both counsel during penalty phase
argument clearly outlined the jury’s duty, consistent with CALJIC
8.84.2 itself, to conduct a qualitative analysis.
The California Supreme Court also rejected this approach in
the present case:
The dissent . . . adopts the novel view, unsupported by any
cited authority, that remarks made by the prosecutor before
trial to unsworn jurors during individual voir dire--which
jurors have not yet been instructed on the law by the court-carry forward to create reversible error in the penalty
phase of the trial.
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People V. Boyde, 46 Cal. 3d 212, 254, 220 Cal. Rptr. 637, 758

P.2d 25.

This Court should not now embrace a rule that would

require a reviewing court to scrutinize each and every offhand
comment made by counsel during voir dire to determine whether
such comments may have had some transient effect on the Jury’s
later interpretation of its instructions.
Closing arguments, on the other hand, heard by Boyde’s jury
immediately prior to being read CALJIC 8.84.2, are very helpful
in determining the way in which the Jury may have approached the
weighing process.

Penry, __ U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 2949-50.

At closing, the prosecutor stated: "ll]t is not a process of
counting .

.

. it is a process of weighing.

And, you should

decide [for example] whether or not that one factor in mitigation
outweighs all those factors in aggravation and then decide the
case."

(J.A. 47).

He continued by telling Jurors to "think in

your own mind and be guided by this one thing: The case, which
according to law as given in the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, warrants the death penalty."

(J.A. 47) (emphasis

added) •
It is, therefore, clear that the Jury was aware that the
weighing process was intended to be a qualitative one, permitting
each Juror to come to a reasoned moral Judgment that death is the
appropriate penalty.
C.

This Court has consistently upheld sentencing schemes
far more restrictive than the California scheme
challenged here.

In a number of decisions, this Court has upheld death
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sentencing schemes that facially restrict the jury’s discretion
to a much greater extent than CALJIC 8.84.2.
For example, in Jurek v. Texas. 428 U.S. 262 ( 1976), this
Court upheld a Texas capital sentencing scheme which required the
sentencing jury to merely answer three narrow questions.
269.

Id. at

If the answer to any one of these questions is no, a

sentence of life imprisonment automatically results.

If the

answer to all three questions is yes, the death sentence is
automatically imposed.

Id_,

Under this procedure, the jury is

given absolutely no discretion to decide the appropriateness of
the penalty beyond that required to answer the three statutory
questions, yet this Court held that such a scheme was in accord
with the Constitution.
This court reviewed the same Texas capital sentencing scheme
just last term in Penry v._Lvnaugh. ___ U.S, __ , 109 S.Ct, 2934.
Although the Court vacated petitioner’s death sentence, it did so
because the three narrow questions were held to have prevented
jurors from considering mitigating evidence offered by the
defense.

Id. at 2952.

The Court left undisturbed the Jurek

Court’s determination that the Texas sentencing scheme did not
improperly restrict the jury’s discretion despite the mandatory
imposition of the sentence of death if the three statutory
questions were answered in the affirmative.

ld_. at 2945.

In the present case, the jurors were not stripped of the
ultimate discretion to decide the appropriate penalty merely
because any statutory questions were answered in a particular
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way.

On the contrary, Boyde’s jurors were explicitly told that

they themselves were to weigh the relevant factors of aggravation
and mitigation and impose the sentence of death only if they
determined that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the
mitigating circumstances.
CALJIC 8.84.2, like the Texas statute approved by this Court
in Jurek and Penry, "guides and focuses the jury’s objective
consideration of the particularized circumstances of the
individual offense and the individual offender before it can
impose a sentence of death."

Jurek. 428 U.S. at 274 .
CONCLUSION

In sum, Boyde’s jury was permitted to hear and give effect
to all evidence introduced in mitigation of the crime, and was
not required to impose the death penalty unless it deemed it to
be the appropriate and just penalty under all the circumstances.
Accordingly, this Court should affirm the judgment of the
California Supreme Court.

Dated: November 14, 1989
Respectfully submitted,
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